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ci.2012.1Abstract When several telecommunication services are running at the same time, undesirable behav-
iors may arise, which are commonly called feature interactions. Several methods have been developed
for detecting and resolving feature interactions.However,most of thesemethods are based on detailed
models of services, which make them suffer from state space explosion. Moreover, different telecom-
munication operators cannot cooperate tomanage feature interactions by exchanging detailed service
models because this violates the conﬁdentiality principle. Our work is a part of the few attempts to
develop feature interaction detection methods targeting to avoid or reduce signiﬁcantly state space
explosion. In order to reach this objective, we ﬁrst develop a so called Cause–Restrict language to
model subscribers of telecommunication services at a very high abstraction level. A Cause–Restrict
model of a subscriber provides information such as: what is the cause of what, and what restricts
(or forbids) what, and speciﬁes coarsely the frequency of each operation ‘‘cause’’ or ‘‘restrict’’ by
‘‘always’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’. Then, we develop a method that detects feature interactions between tele-
communication servicesmodeled in theCause–Restrict language.We demonstrate the applicability of
our approach by modeling several services and detecting several feature interactions between them.
New feature interactions have been detected by our approach.
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0.0021. Introduction
With the great development of telecommunication systems, the
number of services available to the users is continuously
increasing for several years. However, undesirable behaviors
arise when several services S1, . . ., Sn are run together. Those
undesirable behaviors are commonly called feature interactions
(FIs). We say that there is an FI between S1, . . ., Sn or that
those services interact with each other. To be clear, let us give
an example of services Originating Call Screening (OCS) and
Call Forward Unconditional (CFU) and an FI OCS–CFU that
occurs between them: A subscriber of OCS can put phone
numbers in a list LOCS so that every outgoing call from Aier B.V. All rights reserved.
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scriber of CFU can program an automatic forward to a spe-
ciﬁc number so that all his incoming calls are automatically
forwarded to that speciﬁc number. Consider A and B who
are subscribers of OCS and CFU respectively, and a third user
C. Assume that A has put C’s number in his list LOCS with the
idea that a call initiated by A must not be established between
A and C. Assume that B has programmed an automatic
unconditional forward of his incoming calls towards C. OCS
prevents that A calls directly C (who is in LOCS), but the FI
comes from the fact that A can join C by calling B who for-
wards the call to C although C is in LOCS.
Once the services are analyzed together, some FIs may seem
improbable with the impression that experienced designers of
services should not make some ‘‘mistakes’’ that are causes of
FIs. But when studying whether FIs arise between services, a
fundamental assumption is that each service has been designed
independently of the other ones. Not making this assumption
is unrealistic in the general case, because during the design of a
service S, it is practically impossible to consider all the existing
services that may run together with S. Moreover, it is funda-
mentally impossible to consider the non-existing services that
will be designed in the future.
1.1. Existing approaches to FI detection and resolution
FIs have been studied substantially in telecommunication
systems (Bouma and Velthuijsen, 1994; Cheng and Ohta,
1995; Dini et al., 1997; Kimbler and Bouma, 1998; Calder
and Magill, 2000; Amyot and Logrippo, 2003; Reiff-
Marganiec and Ryan, 2005; Du Bousquet and Richier,
2007; Nakamura and Reiff-Marganiec, 2009), and more
recently in other kinds of systems, such as web services
(Weiss et al., 2007). We consider here uniquely telecommuni-
cation services, thus the term service will mean telecommuni-
cation service.
A solution to the FI problem is often operated in two
phases. First, FIs are detected between services. Then, a
FI resolution mechanism is executed to solve the detected
interactions. Most of the FI detection research reported in
the literature uses formal methods. Services are modeled
using a formal language. Then, formal techniques are used
in order to detect possible interactions. The commonly used
formal techniques are temporal logic (Blom et al., 1995),
theorem proving (Gammelgaard and Kristensen, 1994), Petri
nets (Nakamura et al., 1997), extended ﬁnite state automata
(SDL language, for example) (Gibson and Mery, 1997), and
process algebra (LOTOS language, for example) (Amyot
et al., 2000). Informal methods are also used to detect
FIs. For example, Charnois (1997) uses natural language
processing to identify interactions between service logic
requirements modeled as textual descriptions. FI resolution
uses two main methods: restriction and negotiation. Restric-
tion consists in specifying a precedence or exclusion rule to
apply in order to avoid a given FI. Precedence means to run
one service before another and exclusion means to exclude
one of the interacting services. For example, Cherkaoui
and Khoumsi (2002) proposed a solution based on software
agents which apply restriction rules. Other examples of
restriction can be found in (Khoumsi, 1997; Blom et al.,
1994; Tsang and Magill, 1997). The negotiation method tosolve FIs usually uses software agents capable of communi-
cation and negotiation. Kolberg et al. (2002) designed nego-
tiating agents which try to satisfy the preferences of end
users and network operators. Amer et al. (2000) proposed
an architecture that contains negotiating agents which repre-
sent end users and network devices. The work of Griffeth
and Velthuijsen (1994) presents negotiating agents which
represent end users’ preferences.
When detection and resolution are performed at design
time, they are qualiﬁed as off-line. They are qualiﬁed as on-line
if they are performed at runtime. We may also have hybrid ap-
proaches where both off-line and on-line methods are per-
formed (Calder et al., 2007).
Off-line approaches are generally based on formal methods
and necessitate a great amount of information. For example,
methods using model-checking techniques require going
through a state space. The latter increases signiﬁcantly with
the complexity and number of services. Hence, those methods
suffer from the problem of state space explosion. On-line ap-
proaches avoid the state space explosion by considering a state
only when it is reached, instead of considering all possible
states before they are reached. However, on-line methods have
hard timing constraints since they are executed while services
are running.
To provide a solution to the aforementioned state space
explosion, some authors developed pragmatic off-line meth-
ods where services are modeled at a high abstraction level.
For example, Kolberg and Magill (2007) designed a solution
in which every service is abstracted by a triggering party,
and origin and destination parties. As another example,
Chentouf et al. (2004) abstracted services by some process-
ing points that correspond to the main steps in a phone
call, such as OffHook, Dial, Wait, Response Received, and
Speak.
1.2. Our approach to FI detection
We adopt the same approach as (Chentouf et al., 2004; Kol-
berg and Magill, 2007) but with a more ambitious objective
by going further in the abstraction level of services. The aim
is to reduce the state space and avoid revealing details on ser-
vice design. In order to reach this objective, we ﬁrst develop a
so called Cause–Restrict language (or more brieﬂy CR-lan-
guage) to model subscribers of services at a very high abstrac-
tion level. A CR-model (or CR-description) of a subscriber
provides information such as: what is the cause of what, and
what restricts what, and speciﬁes coarsely the frequency of
each operation ‘‘cause’’ or ‘‘restrict’’ by ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘some-
times’’. Then, we develop a method that detects FIs between
CR-models of services. We demonstrate the applicability of
our approach by modeling several concrete services and detect-
ing several FIs between them. Our approach has permitted us
to detect known FIs and, more interestingly, new FIs which we
did not ﬁnd in the literature.
1.3. Structure of the paper
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents
the CR-language which is used to model interfaces and
behaviors of subscribers of services. In Section 3, we develop
a Cause–Restrict-based method for detecting FIs. Section 4
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examples. Section 5 compares the proposed approach with
related works. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 by
recapitulating our results and proposing some future
work.
2. Cause–Restrict language to model interfaces and behaviors
2.1. Outline and Objective of the Cause–Restrict language
Some FI detection methods, like (Chentouf et al., 2004;
Kolberg and Magill, 2007), reduced state space explosion
by modeling services at a high abstraction level. In the
present paper, we target a more ambitious objective by
going further in the abstraction level. Another objective is
to avoid revealing details on service design whenever differ-
ent operators have to exchange their service models. In
such a case, operators want to jointly manage feature inter-
actions that involve services which are deployed in their
networks. For that purpose, we develop a so-called
cause–restrict language to model users of services at two
levels:
– First level: interface modelThe interfaces of calls and
users are modeled as empty objects, that is, by attri-
butes and empty methods, i.e., each method is deﬁned
by just a signature without a body.
– Second level: behavior modelThe behaviors of methods
are modeled at a high abstraction level by the so-called
Cause–Restrict relations (CR-relations). The principle
consists in specifying ‘‘who causes what’’ and ‘‘who
restricts what’’. CR-relations also specify coarsely the
‘‘frequency’’ of the operations, by qualifying each
‘‘cause’’ and ‘‘restrict’’ by ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’.
Such an omission of details is motivated by the desire
to highly abstract models. A set of CR-relations mod-
eling the behavior of a user is called its behavior model,
or more precisely ‘‘CR-behavior model’’ to emphasize
the use of CR-relations.
The composition of the interface and behavior models of a
user is called its CR-model. The CR-model describes service
users logically, in the sense that it speciﬁes how a service be-
haves. The CR-model does not necessarily correspond to the
service implementation. The CR-model is targeted uniquely
to be manipulated by our proposed FI detection method.
Our method detects FIs by manipulating CR-descriptions of
the users of services that are run together. Hence, our FI detec-
tion method uses uniquely information available in CR-mod-
els. In this Section 2, we present the two levels of CR-
modeling, which consist in modeling the interfaces and behav-
iors of users of services, respectively.
The interface modeling is inspired from object oriented pro-
gramming (OOP), which manipulates the notions of classes
and objects. Class names are in bold with the ﬁrst letter non-
capitalized, while object names are in Italic with the ﬁrst letter
capitalized. For simplicity, we will present minimal versions of
classes modeling calls, basic users and subscribers of services.
We will see that these minimal versions are sufﬁcient for
detecting several FIs.Instead of specifying in detail the behavior of each method
of a class, the behavior model consists in specifying expressions
‘‘U R V’’, where R is a relation and U and V may be a method
invocation or a boolean expression. For any U (or V), we say
‘‘we have U’’ or ‘‘U is true’’ to mean that the corresponding
method is invoked or the corresponding condition is satisﬁed.
We have two relations, ‘‘cause’’ and ‘‘restrict’’, which are
tuned by ! and ? in the following way:
– U cause! V means that when we have U, we will cer-
tainly have V;
– U cause? V means that when we have U, we will some-
times have V;
– U restrict! V means that when we have U, V is
forbidden;
– U restrict? V means that when we have U, V is some-
times forbidden.
Each ‘‘U R V’’ is called Cause–Restrict relation, or more
brieﬂy CR-relation. We believe that if the designer makes an
effort to write accurate CR-relations, it is possible to minimize
the number of CR-relations with ‘‘cause?’’ and ‘‘restrict?’’. In-
deed, in Sections 2.2,2.3,2.4 and Appendix A we present exam-
ples of interface models and CR-behavior models of basic
users and subscribers of several services. We use ‘‘cause!’’
and ‘‘restrict!’’ only.
In the sequel, we will use the following terms with a generic
meaning:
– A, B and C denote users
– anyUser denotes any user; for example, anyUser can be
replaced by A, B or C.
– anyCom (X) denotes any method that performs a communi-
cation (using any media) with a user X.
These minimal versions will be sufﬁcient to demonstrate
our FI detection method in several examples (in Section 4).2.2. Classes call and user
The fundamental classes are call and user. Class call models
the interface of an established call, and class user models
the interface of a ‘‘basic’’ user, i.e., a user who subscribes
to no speciﬁc service. We also deﬁne classes calls and users
that model a set of established calls and a set of users, respec-
tively. To give an idea of how the interfaces of a call and a
user are modeled, we present below minimal versions of the
classes call and user.
call:
// Attributes
user Caller // Caller in the current call.
user Callee // Callee in the current call.
user Initiator // Initiator of the current call,
// the user who is the original cause of the
// call.
users Participants // Participants in the current call
// Methods
void accept(user) // Accept a user that joins the current call.
void end() // Terminate the current call.
Z. Chentouf, A. KhoumsiIn a call object modeling a basic call, i.e., where no ser-
vice is involved, the attributes Initiator and Caller are equal,
and the attribute Participants consists uniquely of Caller and
Callee. But this property is not guaranteed when services are
involved.
user :
// Attributes
int number // Phone number of the current user
boolean busy // True when the current user is busy, i.e.,
// he cannot receive a call.
boolean idle // True when the current user is not engaged
// in a call, i.e., Calls= ;.
boolean noAnswer // True when the current user is busy and does
// not answer.
calls Calls // Set of calls where the current user is engaged
users Connected // Set of users connected to the current user
// through a call
// Methods
call call(user) // Initiates a call to a user and returns the
// established call.
// It returns null if no call is established.
call acceptCall(user) // Accepts a call coming from a user and
// returns the established call.
// It returns null if no call is established.
void busy() // Reaction to an incoming call when the
// current user is busy.
void noAnswer() // Reaction to an incoming call when the
// current user does not answer.
void serverFailure() // Reaction to an incoming call when
// the server cannot process it.
void endCall(call) // Terminates a call.
info infoCaller() // The current user receives information
// on the caller,
// e.g., his phone number.
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attributes correspond to information on the user, like number,
busy, Calls and Connected, which are explained above (as com-
ments) in the user class deﬁnition. The methods correspond to
functionalities, like call(), acceptCall(), busy(), noAnswer(),
serverFailure(), endcall() and infoCaller(), which are explained
above in the user class deﬁnition.
2.3. Basic behavior model
The basic behavior model consists of CR-relations specifying
how two basic users A and B (i.e., they subscribe to no speciﬁc
service) behave in a call. Here are some CR-relations of such a
basic behavior model (we have also to repeat all these CR-rela-
tions by switching between A and B):
1a: Call= A.call(B) cause! A= Call.Initiator
2a: A= Call.Initiator cause! A 2Call.Participants
3a: Call= A.call(B) cause! B 2Call. Participants
n{Call.Initiator}
4a: (A.idle= true) restrict! (A.busy= true)
5a: (A.idle= false) cause! (A.busy= true)
6a: (A.noAnswer= true) restrict! (A.busy= true)The CR-relations obtained by switching A and B are num-
bered from 1b to 6b.In the 1st and 3rd CR-relations, ‘‘A.call(B)’’ means that
A calls B, and the fact to write ‘‘Call=’’ means that a ref-
erence to a call is returned, hence the call initiated by A
toward B is established. And the 2nd CR-relation means
that the initiator of a call is certainly a participant of that
call (Call.Initiator 2 Call.Participants). The 3rd CR-relation
means that if A calls successfully B, B is certainly a partic-
ipant, but not the initiator, of the call. The 4th and
5th CR-relations mean that idle and busy are exclusive
status. The 6th CR-relation points out the semantics of
‘‘A.noAnswer= true’’, which is that A is not busy and does
not answer.
The attribute idle may seem redundant with busy, because
idle= true if and only if busy= false, that is, idle is the nega-
tion of busy. We have deﬁned it because the negation relation
between idle and busy does not hold with some speciﬁc ser-
vices. For example, the subscriber of Multiple Lines (ML) ser-
vice (Appendix A.7) is busy when all his lines are busy, and he
is idle when all his lines are idle. Hence, when some (but not
all) lines are busy, the subscriber of ML is neither busy nor
idle.2.4. Subscriber of a service
The interface of a subscriber of a service S is modeled by a
class named userS that inherits from the class user by adding
attributes and modifying and/or adding functionalities. More
precisely:
– A class userS may add one or more new attributes that are not
present in the parent class user. A new attribute represents a
status related to the service. For example, if a service S can be
enabled/disabled by his subscriber, we can use a boolean attribute
that speciﬁes whether S is enabled or disabled. The latter type of
attribute is qualiﬁed as generic because it is deﬁned in a generic
way. We can also have speciﬁc attributes that are deﬁned only for
a speciﬁc service.
– A class userS necessarily behaves differently than the parent class
user, for example by handling new attribute(s). Such a different
behavior is possible only by modifying functionalities of the parent
class user and/or by adding new functionalities that are absent in
user. In the interface modeling, adding functionalities is modeled
by deﬁning new methods, while modifying functionalities is mod-
eled by overriding methods of user. Recall that in the interface
modeling, methods are deﬁned just by their signature. Their behav-
iors are deﬁned by properties in the behavior model (second level of
the CR-model).
The behavior model of a subscriber of a service S is deﬁned
by adding and/or removing properties of the basic behavior
model.
To give an idea on interface and behavior models, we pres-
ent in the following Sections 2.4.1,2.4.2,2.4.3,2.4.4,2.4.5,2.4.6
several service subscribers. Other services subscribers are pre-
sented in Appendix A.2.4.1. Subscriber of Call Forward Unconditional (CFU)
A subscriber of CFU can program an automatic forward to a
user so that all his incoming calls are automatically forwarded
to the speciﬁed user.
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userCFU extends user
// Attributes
user forward // Speciﬁc attribute indicating
// the user to whom incoming calls
// are forwarded.
// Methods
call acceptCall (user) // Overrides the method
// acceptCall() of the class userThe method acceptCall() of user is overridden because
acceptance of an incoming call by CFU consists in forwarding
the call.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of CFU
In the basic behavior model, the CR-relation 3a is removed
and the following CR-relations are added:
ðB:forward¼CÞ^A:callðBÞ cause! B:callðCÞ
ðB:forward¼CÞ^ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ cause!C2Call:ParticipantsIn these CR-relations, ‘‘B.forward= C’’ means that B has
programmed an automatic forward toward C. Hence, the 1st
CR-relation means that if A calls B who has programmed a
forward to C, then B will automatically call C. And the 2nd
CR-relation means that if A calls successfully B who has pro-
grammed a forward to C, then C is certainly a participant of
the call.
2.4.2. Subscriber of Terminating Call Screening (TCS)
A subscriber of TCS registers users in a list LTCS so that every
incoming call from a user registered in LTCS is automatically
blocked.
Interface model: subscriber of TCS
userTCS extends user
// Attributes
users ListTcs // Speciﬁc attribute
// corresponding to
// LTCS of the current subscriber of
// TCS.
// Methods
call acceptCall(user) // Overrides the method accept
// Call() of the class user.The method acceptCall() of user is overridden because
incoming calls from users registered in LTCS must not be
established.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of TCS
The following CR-relations are added to the basic behavior
model:
ðA2B:ListTcsÞ^A:callðBÞrestrict!A:anyComðBÞ
ðA2B:ListTcsÞ^A:callðBÞrestrict! B:anyComðAÞ
ðA2B:ListTcsÞ^ðB2Call:ParticipantsnfCall:InitiatorgÞ restrict!A2Call:Participants
ðA2B:ListTcsÞ^ðA¼Call:InitiatorÞ restrict! B2Call:Participants
The 1st and 2nd CR-relations mean that if A is in LTCS
of B and A calls B, then A cannot be in communication
with B. For that purpose, if A is in LTCS of B and A calls
B, we forbid that any communication method of A be calledwith B as argument and that any communication method of
B be called with A as argument. This is a guarantee that no
communication initiated by A can be established between A
and B. The 3nd CR-relation means that if A is in LTCS of B
and B participates in a call he has not initiated, then A can-
not be a participant of that call. The 4th CR-relation means
that if A initiates a call and is in LTCS, then B cannot be a
participant of that call.
2.4.3. Subscriber of Automatic Recall (AR)
A subscriber B of AR can enable AR so that if B is called from
any user A while he is busy, then a call is automatically gener-
ated from B to A as soon as B is idle again.Interface model: subscriber of AR
userAR extends user
// Attributes
boolean ar // Generic attribute indicating
// whether AR is enabled.
// Methods
void busy() // Overrides the method
// busy() of the class user.The method busy() of user is overridden because AR mod-
iﬁes the reaction to incoming calls when B is busy.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of AR
The following CR-relation is added to the basic behavior
model:ðB:ar¼ trueÞ^Call¼A:callðBÞ^ðB:busy¼ trueÞ cause!
B:callðAÞ^ðB2Call:ParticipantsnfCall:InitiatorgÞ^ ðA¼Call:InitiatorÞ
The above CR-relation means that if AR is enabled and A calls
successfully B who is busy, then B will call A in order to estab-
lish the call initiated by A.2.4.4. Subscriber of Call Waiting (CW)
If a subscriber B of CW is called from a user A while B is in
communication with a user C, then A is put on hold. Then,
B can put C on hold and connect to A. B can switch between
A and C.Interface model: subscriber of CW
userCW extends user
// Attributes: no
// new attribute is
// deﬁned
// Methods
void busy() // Overrides the method busy() o
// the class user.
call hold(user) // New method: it accepts a call
// coming fromauser but puts him
// on hold; it
// returns the established call; It
// returns null if no call is
// established.
void hold(call, user) // New method: it puts on hold
// user participating in a call.fa
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iﬁes the reaction to incoming calls when B is busy. Two new
methods hold() are added.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of CW
The following CR-relation is added to the basic behavior
model:
A:callðBÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ cause!B:holdðAÞ
The above CR-relation means that if A calls B who is busy,
then B will put A on hold.
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If a user A calls a subscriber B of UM who is busy or does not
answer, then A is forwarded to a voicemail server to leave a
voice message to B. What has just been said corresponds to
the service named Voicemail (VM). We obtain UM from
VM by requiring that the voice message left by A is sent by
email to B.
Interface model: subscriber of UM
userUM extends
user
// Attributes
boolean um //Generic attribute indicating
// whether UM is enabled.
// Methods
call // Overrides the method
acceptCall(user) // acceptCall() of the class user.
void // uniﬁedMessaging(user, voice)
// New method:
// it receives by
// email a voice
// message from a
// user.The method acceptCall() of user is overridden because UM
modiﬁes the reaction to incoming calls. A new methods uniﬁed-
Messaging() is added.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of UM
The following CR-relation is added to the basic behavior
model:
ðB:um¼ trueÞ^A:callðBÞ^ðB:busy¼ true_B:noAnswer¼ trueÞ cause!
B:unifiedMessagingðA; VoiceMsgÞ
The above CR-relation means that if UM is enabled and A
calls B who is busy or does not answer, then B will receive from
A an email containing a recorded voice message.2.4.6. Subscriber of Follow-Me (FM)
A subscriber of FM can specify a list of numbers where to join
him in a given order. That is, if the ﬁrst number is not busy and
does not answer, then the second number is tried and so on, un-
til one of the numbers answers or none of the numbers answers.
The ﬁrst number in the list is considered as the subscriber of
FM, and the other numbers constitute an ordered list LFM.
Conceptually, this is equivalent to deﬁning a list of users to join
in a given order until one of them answers or all the list is tried
without answer. The latter behavior is called Hunt Group or
Group-Calling service. Here, we model the FM service only be-
cause Group-Calling is conceptually equivalent to it.Interface model: subscriber of FM
userFM extends user
// Attributes
users ListFm // Speciﬁc attribute corresponding
// to LFM of the subscriber of FM
user FirstAnswer // Speciﬁc attribute corresponding
// to the ﬁrst number in LFM
// (if any) who
// answers while the preceding
// numbers in the list are not busy
// and do not
// answer.
// Methods
void noAnswer() // Overrides the method
//noAnswer() of the class user.The method noAnswer() of user is overridden because a
new behavior is triggered by ‘‘No answer’’ in FM: trying the
next number.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of FM
In the basic behavior model, the CR-relation 3a
(Call= A.call(B) cause! B2Call.Participants n{Call.Initiator})
is removed and the following CR-relations are added:
ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ^ðB:noAnswer¼ trueÞ cause!ðB:FirstAnswer2Call:ParticipantsÞ
ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ^ðB:noAnswer¼ trueÞ restrict! ðB2Call:ParticipantsÞ
The above CR-relations mean that if A calls B who is not
busy and does not answer, then the ﬁrst user in LFM who an-
swers (if any) becomes a participant of the call while B is not a
participant of the call.2.5. Subscriber of several services
In Section 2.4, we have shown how to specify the interface and
behavior of a subscriber of a service S: the interface is con-
structed by using inheritance from the class user. This ap-
proach can be generalized to specify the interface of a
subscriber of several services as follows: a subscriber of several
services S1,. . .,Sn can be considered as several subscribers Sub-
s1,. . .,Subsn, where each Subsi has a single service Si. Hence,
the interface of each Subsi is modeled as an object of a class
userSi inheriting from the class user.
Note that in the interface speciﬁcation, we cannot specify
the difference between a method of user and a method with
the same name that overrides it in userS. For example:
acceptCall() which are used in user, userCFU, userTCS; and
busy() which are used in user, userAR, userCW. The difference
between the methods with the same name can be speciﬁed in the
behavior model.2.6. Less accurate CR-Relations: cause? restrict?
All the CR-relations in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 use ‘‘cause!’’
and ‘‘restrict!’’, while ‘‘cause?’’ and ‘‘restrict?’’ are never used.
This is because we have made an effort to write CR-relations
as accurate as possible. But if information is removed from a
CR-relation, we may have to replace ‘‘!’’ by ‘‘?’’. Let us show
this by using a few examples:
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If, in Section 2.4.1, we remove ‘‘B.forward= C’’, we have
to replace ‘‘cause!’’ by ‘‘cause?’’:
A:callðBÞcause? ðB:callðCÞÞ
ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause?C 2 Call:Participants
Intuitively, in Section 2.4.1, we are more accurate by
assuming that B has programmed a forward toward C, while
here the assumption is removed.
Subscriber of TCS
If, in Section 2.4.2, we remove ‘‘B2Call.Participants
n{Call.Initiator}’’ from the 3rd CR-relation, we have to replace
‘‘restrict!’’ by ‘‘restrict?’’:
ðA 2 B:ListTcsÞ restrict?A 2 Call:Participants
Intuitively, in the 3rd CR-relation of Section 2.4.2, we are
more accurate by assuming that B participates in a given call
without being the initiator of that call, while here the assump-
tion is removed.
Subscriber of AR
If, in Section 2.4.3, we remove ‘‘A.ar= true’’ and/or ‘‘B.bu-
sy= true’’, we have to replace ‘‘cause!’’ by ‘‘cause?’’:
ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause? B:callðAÞ ^ ðB
2 Call:Participants n fCall:InitiatorgÞ ^ ðA
¼ Call:InitiatorÞ
Intuitively, in Section 2.4.3, we considered only the situation
where AR is enabled and B is busy, while here the assumption is
removed.
Subscriber of CW
If, in Section 2.4.4, we remove ‘‘B.busy= true’’, we have to
replace ‘‘cause!’’ by ‘‘cause?’’:
A:callðBÞ cause?B:holdðAÞ
Intuitively, in Section 2.4.4, we are more accurate by
assuming that B is busy, while here the assumption is removed.
Subscriber of UM
If, in Section 2.4.5, we remove ‘‘(B.um= true)  (B.bu-
sy= true  B.noAnswer= true)’’, we have to replace ‘‘cause!’’
by ‘‘cause?’’:
A:callðBÞ cause? B:unifiedMessagingðB; VoiceMsgÞ:
Intuitively, in Section 2.4.5, we are more accurate by assum-
ing that UM is enabled, while here the assumption is removed.
Subscriber of FM
If, in Section 2.4.6, we remove ‘‘B.noAnswer= true’’, we
have to replace ‘‘cause!’’ by ‘‘cause?’’ and ‘‘restrict!’’ by
‘‘restrict?’’:
ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause? ðB:FirstAnswer 2 Call:ParticipantsÞ
ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ restrict? ðB 2 Call:ParticipantsÞ
Intuitively, in Section 2.4.6, we are more accurate by
assuming that the subscriber of FM (i.e., the ﬁrst number in
the list) is busy or does not answer, while here the assumption
is removed.
2.7. Some properties and rules of CR-relations
This section presents some rules of CR-relations. Two CR-
relations are said incompatible if it is nonsense (or impossible)to have them together in the same CR-behavior model. Incom-
patible CR-relations are symptoms of FIs.
‘‘U cause! V’’ and ‘‘U restrict! V’’ are incompatible,
‘‘U cause! V’’ and ‘‘U restrict? V’’ are incompatible,
‘‘U cause? V’’ and ‘‘U restrict! V’’ are incompatible.
Note that ‘‘U cause? V’’ and ‘‘U restrict? V’’ are not
incompatible.
Before continuing, we need to deﬁne the notions of weaker
and stronger CR-relations. A CR-relation M1 is said to be
stronger than a CR-relation M2 if M1 implies M2; we can also
say that M2 is weaker than M1.
Below are four rules that permit to derive a weaker CR-
relation from an existing CR-relation; these rules are easily
understandable from the fact that ‘‘cause!’’ and ‘‘restrict!’’
are stronger than ‘‘cause?’’ and ‘‘restrict?’’ respectively, and
X  Y implies both X and Y:
R1: ‘‘U  Z cause! V‘‘=> ‘‘U cause? V’’,
R2: ‘‘U  Z restrict! V‘‘=> ‘‘U restrict? V’’,
R3: ‘‘U cause! V  Z‘‘=> ‘‘U cause! V’’.
R4: ‘‘U cause? V  Z‘‘=> ‘‘U cause? V’’.
If we take Z equal to true, R3 and R4 become trivial, while
R1 and R2 become:
r1: ‘‘U cause! V‘‘=> ‘‘U cause? V’’,
r2: ‘‘U restrict! V‘‘=> ‘‘U restrict? V’’.
Note that R1 and R2 have been used to obtain the CR-rela-
tions of Section 2.6 from the CR-relations of Section 2.4.
To make the FI detection as efﬁcient as possible, we
should enrich the resulting CR-behavior model by using
the rules below to derive a CR-relation from two existing
CR-relations. The enrichment is motivated by the fact that
CR-relations are used to detect FIs, hence the more we have
CR-relations the more we can detect FIs. Another approach
is to have a non-enriched speciﬁcation and to apply the
enrichment during FI detection. That is, the enrichment
could be moved from ‘‘before FI detection’’ to ‘‘during FI
detection’’. But this will make the FI detection more com-
plex and enrichment will be executed several times (at each
FI detection).
R5: ‘‘U cause! V’’ and ‘‘V  Z cause! W’’=>‘‘ U  Z cause! W’’
R6: ‘‘U cause? V’’ and ‘‘V  Z cause! W’’=>‘‘U  Z cause? W’’
R7: ‘‘U cause! V’’ and ‘‘ V  Z restrict! W’’=> ‘‘U  Z restrict! W’’
R8: ‘‘U cause? V’’ and ‘‘ V  Z restrict! W’’=> ‘‘U  Z restrict?
W’’
Below are other rules that permit to enrich the CR-behavior
model:
R9: ‘‘U cause! V  Z’’ and ‘‘V cause! W’’=> ‘‘ U cause! W  Z’’
R10: ‘‘U cause? V  Z’’ and ‘‘V cause! W’’=> ‘‘ U cause? W  Z’’
If we take Z equal to true in R5–R8, we obtain the follow-
ing rules r5–r8, while if we take Z equal to true in R9–R10, we
obtain r5–r6.
r5: ‘‘U cause! V’’ and ‘‘V cause! W’’=> ‘‘U cause! W’’
r6: ‘‘U cause? V’’ and ‘‘V cause! W’’=> ‘‘U cause? W’’
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r8: ‘‘U cause? V’’ and ‘‘V restrict! W’’=> ‘‘U restrict? W’’
Note that rules R5–R10 and r5–r8 are in the form ‘‘U R1
V’’ and ‘‘V  Z R2 W’’=> ‘‘U  Z R W’’ where R2 equals
to ‘‘cause!’’ or ‘‘restrict!’’, and R1 can be ‘‘cause!’’ or ‘‘cause?’’.
This is because we cannot deduce a new CR-relation when R2
equals to ‘‘cause?’’ or ‘‘restrict?’’. Let us explain this in the
following two examples:
– U causes certainly V (U cause! V) and V causes W only when it is
not caused by U (V cause? W). This situation does not allow us to
deduce that U causes W.
– U causes certainly V (U cause! V) and V forbids W only when it is
not caused by U (V restrict? W). This situation does not allow us to
deduce that U forbids W.
Other rules can be found, but the above ones are sufﬁcient
for a good comprehension of the CR-language and for our FI
detection method.
2.8. Discussion on how to onstruct interface and Behavior
Models
The interface and behavior models do not correspond neces-
sarily to two consecutive steps. Actually, the two tasks are inti-
mately related. We may start by determining intuitively
fundamental properties and then we determine attributes and
methods that permit to express those properties formally.
The task sequence that should be used is the following:
1. We intuitively determine properties the non-respect of which is
judged potential and problematic.
2. We determine attributes and methods (the latter by their signature)
that are necessary to express formally the properties of Item 1.
3. We formally express the properties of Item 1.
Interface and behavior models are obtained at the terms of
Items 2 and 3, respectively. Note that Item 1 precedes interface
and behavior models.
3. FI detection method based on Cause–Restrict language
There exist many FI detection methods using detailed and com-
plex speciﬁcations of services as inputs, and applying model-
checking techniques to detect FIs automatically. Those methods
present the advantage of having a high power of detection, but
their main drawback is their state space complexity.
There exists no miraculous solution to this problem, we can
reduce it, but by accepting a smaller power of detection and/or
a less automatic detection process. This is the approach we
have adopted. In order to reduce the state space complexity,
we model subscribers of services in the CR-language. Actually,
instead of detecting FIs with certitude, our method draws the
attention on suspected FIs, which then need to be checked
(automatically or manually). This is the price to pay to reduce
very signiﬁcantly the state space complexity.
In this Section, we propose an off-line cause–restrict-based
method for detecting FIs between services. The approach is to
have a CR-behavior model of each type of subscriber of service
and to merge the CR-behavior models of the subscribers of
services that are run together. FIs are detected by analyzing
the resulting CR-behavior model.3.1. Inputs: CR-behavior models
During the design of a service S1, we have to check whether
there exist FIs between S1 and existing services S2,. . .,Sn that
may have to be run together with S1. When we say that services
S1,. . .,Sn are run together, we mean that subscribers of those
services are engaged in a same call session. The CR-behavior
models of the subscribers of S1,. . .,Sn are the inputs of the FI
detection procedure. An approach is to require that the service
provider that is the owner of any deployed service S provides
the CR-behavior model of a subscriber of S; this CR-behavior
model will be available for designers of new services.
3.2. Step 1: Merging and enriching the CR-behavior models
In order to detect FIs between S1,. . .,Sn that may have to be
run together, we merge the CR-behavior models of their
subscribers. The merging consists in obtaining a single CR-
behavior model by putting together the n CR-behavior models.
After the merging, the resulting CR-behavior model is
enriched in the following two ways:
(a) The rules R5–R10 and r5–r8 of Section 2.7 are applied maxi-
mally. That is, we synthesize all the new CR-relations that
can be obtained from those rules. This can be done by using
a ﬁx-point method, which repeats the application of the rules
until no new CR-relation is generated. The method converges
because the number of possible CR-relations is ﬁnite. Note that
this enrichment is automatable. Note that rules R1–R4 and
r1–r2 are not used here because they permit to derive weaker
CR-relations, which is not relevant for FI detection.
(b) New CR-relations can be added for stating relations between
variables or methods of various services. For example, a rela-
tion between a variable of S1 and a variable of S2. This enrich-
ment is generally non automatable and is realized by the
designer in order to model relations he has identiﬁed.
3.3. Step 2: FI Detection
In the sequel, by ‘‘cause’’ we mean ‘‘cause!’’ or ‘‘cause?’’, and
by ‘‘restrict’’ we mean ‘‘restrict!’’ or ‘‘restrict?’’. As already
mentioned, our method does not target to indicate FIs with
certitude, it rather draws the attention on suspected FIs, which
then need to be checked (automatically or manually). FI detec-
tion consists in analyzing the whole CR-behavior model ob-
tained in Step 1, and in generating an FI detection verdict.
The analysis consists in checking the existence of the following
FI patterns in the CR-behavior model obtained in Step 1. In
the following, U and V are said to be compatible if and only
if we can have them at the same time.
(a) cause–loop: There exists a series of CR-relations ‘‘U1  Y1 cause
U2’’, . . .,‘‘Ui  Yi cause Ui+1’’,. . .,‘‘Un  Yn cause U1’’ such that
U1 is a method invocation. This is a symptom of loop (or cycle)
that may induce a blocking behavior. This is more understand-
able with the simple form where all Yi equal to true, which gives
‘‘U1 cause U2’’,. . .,‘‘Un cause U1’’. In fact, we obtain the simple
form by applying rule R1 of Section 2.7 to the general form.
Hence, instead of considering the general form of the cause–
loop pattern, an alternative is to ﬁrst apply rules R1 and then
to consider uniquely the simple form.In the presence of a
cause–loop symptom, we have to check if the cycle or blocking
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in Section 4.1.1.
(b) cause–restrict: There exists a pair of CR-relations ‘‘U cause W’’
and ‘‘V restrict W’’ such that we have no certitude that U and V
are incompatible. More precisely, either we have the certitude
that U and V are compatible, or we are uncertain of their com-
patibility. This is a symptom of conﬂict (or contradiction), where
an action or condition W may be at the same time caused and
forbidden. A particular case is when U equals to V, that is, W
may be at the same time caused and forbidden by the same U.In
the presence of a cause–restrict symptom, we have to check if
there really exists a situation where an action (or condition) is
at the same time caused and forbidden. Cause–restrict is illus-
trated in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.Note that there is no symptom
of FIs if we are certain that U and V are incompatible.
(c) cause–cause: There exists a pair of CR-relations ‘‘U  Y cause
V’’ and ‘‘U  Z cause W’’, such that we have no certitude that Y
and Z are incompatible. More precisely, either we have the cer-
titude that Y and Z are compatible, or we are uncertain of their
compatibility. This may be a symptom of conﬂict or confusion.
This is more understandable in the particular case where Y and
Z equal to true, which gives ‘‘U cause V’’ and ‘‘U cause W’’.
Intuitively, the same U causes both V and W.In the presence
of a cause–cause symptom, we have to check if V and W are,
for example, incompatible or redundant. Section 4.3.1 contains
an example of cause–cause corresponding to a conﬂict. Sec-
tion 4.3.2 contains an example of cause–cause which corre-
sponds to a conﬂict only under speciﬁc conditions.
Fundamentally, cause–restrict can be seen as a particular
case of cause–cause, because ‘‘V restrict W’’ can be written
‘‘V cause neg(W)’’, where neg(W) denotes the negation of W.
Hence, the pattern ‘‘U cause W’’ and ‘‘V restrict W’’ can be
written ‘‘U cause W’’ and ‘‘V cause neg(W)’’. But we preferred
to keep the two patterns so that the designer can select the one
which is closer to the intuition, depending on the example.
4. Examples of FI detection
In this section, we apply the method described in Section 3
for the detection of several FIs between two services among
the services presented in Section 2. Other examples are gi-
ven in Appendix B. Each FI is named in the form S1–S2,
where S1 and S2 are the two services that interact. Each
FI S1–S2 is ﬁrstly presented intuitively by a context and a
scenario:
– Context: we indicate the users involved in the FI; we also indicate
the user who subscribes to each service S1 or S2 and specify how
each S1 and S2 are programmed.
– Scenario of FI: We present an example of execution where the FI
S1–S2 arises.
Then, we show how the FI is detected using the FI detection
method of Section 3. Sometimes, we conclude by indicating
other resembling FIs. The resemblance is meant in the way
the FI is detected at the formal level.
4.1. Cause–loop FI
4.1.1. CFU–CFU
Context: Consider A and B who are subscribers of CFU. As-
sume that A (resp. B) has programmed an automatic forward
of his incoming calls towards B (resp. A).Scenario of FI: A calls B who calls A. We have a loop (or
cycle) of actions.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method. By adapting the 1st CR-relation of Section 2.4.1, we
obtain:
– For the subscriber B of CFU that has programmed a forward
toward A:
M1 : ðB:forward ¼ AÞ ^ A:callðBÞ cause!ðB:callðAÞÞ
– For the subscriber A of CFU that has programmed a forward
toward B:
M2 : ðA:forward ¼ BÞ ^ B:callðAÞ cause!ðA:callðBÞÞ
The pair of CR-relations (M1,M2) constitutes a cause–loop
symptom in the form ‘‘U1  Y1 cause U2’’, ‘‘U2  Y2
cause U1’’, where U1=’’A.call(B)’’, U2=‘‘B.call(A)’’,
Y1=‘‘B.forward=A’’ and Y2=‘‘A.forward=B’’. We have
checked that the corresponding loop A.call(B)–B.call(A)–
A.call(B) can occur (see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain resembling FIs if we replace CFU by other ver-
sions of Call Forward, like Call Forward on Busy Line
(CFBL), Call Forward on No Reply (CFNR), Call Forward
on Time (CFT). We can hence deﬁne various combinations
of FIs, like CFU–CFBL, CFBL–CFBL, CFNR–CFBL, etc.4.2. Cause–restrict FI
4.2.1. AR–TCS
Context: Consider two users A and B, where B is subscriber to
TCS and AR. Assume that B has put A in his list LTCS, with
the idea that a call involving B but not initiated by B has no
effect on A (hence B is not authorized to be joined by A).
Scenario of FI: TCS prevents that B is directly joined by A.
But consider that A calls B while B is busy. As soon as B be-
comes not busy, an automatic recall will connect B to A (and B
is joined by A), although A is in LTCS. Here, we say that B is
joined by A (and not that B joins A), because A is the initiator
of the call in the sense that A is the original cause of the call.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of TCS that has put A in LTCS, we have by
using the 3rd CR-relation of Section 2.4.2:
M1 : ðA 2 B:ListTcsÞ ^ ðB 2 Call:Participants n fCall:InitiatorgÞrestrict!
A 2 Call:Participants
– For the subscriber B of AR that has programmed an automatic
recall and receives a call from A while he is busy, we have by using
CR-relation of Section 2.4.3:
M2 : ðB:ar¼ trueÞ^ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ^ðB:busy¼ trueÞ cause!
B:callðAÞ^ ðB2Call:ParticipantsnfCall:InitiatorgÞ^ ðA¼Call:InitiatorÞ
– For the user A that initiates a call, we have by using the 2nd CR-
relation of Section 2.3:
M3 : A ¼ Call:Initiator cause! A 2 Call:Participants
By applying rule R9 To M2 and M3 with V=’’ A=Call.Ini-
tiator’’, W=’’ A2Call.Participants’’, U=’’(B.ar=true) 
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(B2Call.Participants n {Call.Initiator})’’, we obtain:
N1 : ðB:ar ¼ trueÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ cause!
B:callðAÞ ^ ðB 2 Call:Participants n fCall:InitiatorgÞ ^ ðA 2 Call:ParticipantsÞ
By applying rule R3–N1 with Z=’’B.call(A) 
(B2Call.Participants n {Call.Initiator})’’, we obtain:
N2 : ðB:ar ¼ trueÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ ^ ðB:busy
¼ trueÞ cause! ðA 2 Call:ParticipantsÞ
The pair of CR-relations (M1,N2) constitutes a cause–re-
strict pattern which is a symptom of conﬂict. We have checked
that we can reach a situation where the participation of A in a
call is at the same time implied by AR and forbidden by TCS
(see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI AR–OCS if we replace ‘‘B is
subscriber of TCS’’ by ‘‘A is subscriber of OCS’’ (OCS is pre-
sented in Appendix A.1).
4.2.2. TCS–FM
Context: Consider B and C who are subscribers to FM and
TCS respectively, and a third user A. Assume that C has put
A in his list LTCS with the idea that a call involving C but
not initiated by C has no effect on A (hence C is not authorized
to be joined by A). Assume that C is the ﬁrst user in LFM who
answers.
Scenario of FI: TCS prevents that C is directly joined by A
in a basic call. But if A calls B and B does not answer the call,
C will be joined by A although A is in LTCS.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of FM who is called by A, we have by using
the CR-relation of Section 2.4.6:
M1 : ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ^ðB:noAnswer¼ trueÞ cause!ðB:FirstAnswer2Call:ParticipantsÞ
M2 : ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ^ðB:noAnswer¼ trueÞ restrict! ðB2Call:ParticipantsÞ
– For the subscriber C of TCS that has put A in LTCS, , we have by
adapting the 4th CR-relation of Section 2.4.2:
M3 : ðA 2 C:ListTcsÞ ^ ðA ¼ Call:InitiatorÞ restrict! C
2 Call:Participants
Since C=B.FirstAnswer (see assumption in the above
Context), the pair of CR-relations (M1,M3) constitutes a
cause–restrict pattern, which is a symptom of conﬂict. We have
checked that we can reach a situation where the participation
of C in a call is at the same time implied by FM and forbidden
by TCS (see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI if we replace ‘‘C subscriber of
TCS’’ by ‘‘A subscriber of OCS’’ (OCS is presented in Appen-
dix A.1).
4.3. Cause–cause FI
4.3.1. AR–CW
Context: Consider two users A and B, where B is a subscriber
to AR and CW.
Scenario of FI: If A calls a busy user B, A is put on hold by
B (according to CW) while A is recalled back later by B(according to AR). But, it is nonsense to execute the two ac-
tions because they target the same objective, which is to put
A and B in communication. So, which action should be
executed?
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of AR that has programmed an automatic
recall and receives a call from A while he is busy, we have by using
the CR-relation of Section 2.4.3:
M1 : ðB:ar¼ trueÞ^ ðCall¼A:callðBÞÞ^ðB:busy¼ trueÞ cause!
B:callðAÞ^ðB2Call:ParticipantsnfCall:InitiatorgÞ^ðA¼Call:InitiatorÞ
– For the subscriber B of CW that receives a call from A while he is
busy and puts A on hold, we have by using the CR-relation of
Section 2.4.4:
M2 : A:callðBÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ cause!B:holdðAÞ
The pair of CR-relations (M1,M2) constitutes a cause–
cause pattern. We have checked that we can reach a situation
where B calls A according to AR while B puts A on hold
according to CW (see the above Context-Scenario).
4.3.2. CW–UM
Context: Consider two users A and B, where B is subscriber to
CW and UM.
Scenario of FI: If A calls a busy B, A is put on hold by B
(according to CW) while B receives a voice message by email
from A (according to UM). Which of the two actions should
be executed? Should we execute both actions?
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of CW that receives a call from A while he is
busy and puts A on hold, we have by using the CR-relation of
Section 2.4.4:
M1 : A:callðBÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ cause!B:holdðAÞ
– For the subscriber B of UM that receives a call from A and then
sends him a voicemail message, we have by using the CR-relation
of Section 2.4.5:
M2 : ðB:um¼ trueÞ^A:callðBÞ^ ðB:busy¼ true_B:noAnswer¼ trueÞ cause!
B:unifiedMessagingðA; VoiceMsgÞ
The pair of CR-relations (M1,M2) constitutes a cause–
cause FI symptom. We have checked that we can reach a
situation where B puts A on hold according to CW while B
receives a voice message by email according to UM (see the
above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI if we replace ‘‘B subscriber of
UM’’ by ‘‘B is subscriber of VM’’ or ‘‘A subscriber of Email’’
(Email is presented in Appendix A.2).
4.4. Recapitulation
In addition to the FIs of Section 4 that involve the services of
Section 2.4, we have also detected the FIs of Appendix B that
involve also the services of Appendix A. Table 1 outlines the
FIs we have detected between every pair of the thirteen services
of Section 2.4 and Appendix A. The services presented in
Table 1 Detected FIs.
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FI is indicated by cl (cause–loop), cr (cause–restrict), and cc
(cause–cause), while x means ‘‘no FI is detected’’. For clarity,
we also use colors to indicate cl (yellow), cr (green) and cc
(blue). For brevity, some detected FIs have not been
presented; they are indicated with * in Table 1. Considering
that the same FI can be named S1–S2 and S2–S1, Table 1 is a
symmetric matrix; that is why only a triangular half of Table 1
is speciﬁed.
4.5. New FIs
Our Cause–Restrict approach has been validated for the
detection of several FIs known and documented in the liter-
ature, like all FIs not using services CC, FM, BLF, PIN and
ML. We have also detected new FIs, i.e., FIs which we were
unaware of (we did not ﬁnd them in the literature). These
new FIs are those using services CC, FM, BLF, PIN and
ML. Some of these new FIs have been presented in detail
in Section 4 (FM–TCS) and Appendix B (CC–OCS, ML–
BLF, PIN–TCS). Other new FIs have been mentioned as
resembling to the FIs presented in detail, like CC-TCS which
resembles CC–OCS, and FM–OCS which resembles FM–
TCS. Those resembling FIs CC–TCS and FM–OCS can be
easily deduced from the original FIs CC–OCS and FM–
TCS, by using the analogy between OCS and TCS. Other
new FIs have not been presented for brevity. They are indi-
cated by * in Table 1. Let us present their principle intuitively
and brieﬂy.
Interactions ML-S, where S equals to AR, CW, or UM
ML assumes that his subscriber can be at the same time not
idle and not busy, when some (but not all) of his lines are busy.
The other services (AR, CW, UM) assume that B is idle if and
only if he is not idle. Let S be one of these three services and
assume that B is a subscriber of ML and S. If B has one of
his lines busy and receives a call from A, then, should service
S be triggered (by considering B busy, according to S) or not
(by considering B as not busy, according to ML)?
Interactions FM-S, where S equals to CFU, UM, or Email
FM assumes that if his subscriber receives a call and does
not answer and is not busy, then another number is tried.
The other services (CFU, UM, Email) assume that another ac-
tion A (different from trying another number) is executedwhen B receives a call. Let S be one of these three services
and assume that B is a subscriber of FM and S. If B receives
a call from A and does not answer, should action A be exe-
cuted (according to S) or should another number be tried
(according to FM)?
Interactions PIN-S, where S equals to AR or BLF
When a subscriber A of PIN calls a subscriber B of S from
the phone of a user C, it is not clear whether S should behave
with respect to A or to C. For example, should AR recall A or
C? And should BLF display information on A or on C?5. Related work
To our best knowledge, Chentouf et al. (2004) and Kolberg
and Magill (2007) are two approaches that are closely related
to our approch. Let us, therefore, make a comparative analysis
of our contributions with these references.
Chentouf et al. (2004) and Kolberg and Magill (2007) had
the research objective to come out with a service modeling lan-
guage that abstracts service details. Both research works pro-
posed abstract languages and associated FI detection
methods that are based on a syntactical comparison of service
models and FI detection rules that incarnate pre-deﬁned FI
patterns. Unknown FI cannot be detected by those two ap-
proaches unless the corresponding FI detection rules are set.
Our FI detection method is semantics-based. It abstracts all
the actions into two: cause and restrict, and it relies on three
ﬁxed FI patterns that will not need to be updated as new ser-
vices are added: cause–loop, cause–cause, and cause–restrict.
This fundamental difference between our work and the two re-
lated ones clearly shows that ours is better than the two other
approaches.
A second difference between our proposed approach and
the two related ones consists in the expressiveness of the service
modeling languages and the effectiveness of the associated FI
detection methods. In fact, the language proposed by Chen-
touf et al. (2004), called Feature Interaction Management Lan-
guage (FIML), cannot model CC, PIN, BLF, UM, and ML.
The language of Kolberg and Magill (2007) cannot capture
CC, PIN, BLF, UM, ML, FM, Email, and F-Email. Conse-
quently, the other two approaches cannot detect FI among
those services.
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two related ones is the abstraction level of the modeling lan-
guage. As already explained, our approach is semantic while
the two related works are syntactical. If two service opera-
tors networks need to interoperate, they have to adopt the
CR-language. They only need to exchange the behavior
descriptions of their services; the interface descriptions do
not have to be communicated. Compared with FIML, the
behavior part of the CR-language is situated at the same le-
vel of abstraction as both languages contain the same con-
cepts: user, address, call; events like busy, no answer, etc.;
and actions such as hold, email, etc. However, in FIML,
every service behavior statement has to be written under a
speciﬁc processing point. A processing point indicates the
step of the call processing, for example, dialing, response re-
ceived, call established, etc. This level of details is not re-
vealed in the CR-language, and hence the CR-language is
more abstract than FIML.
The work of Kolberg and Magill (2007) contains two parts:
the ﬁrst part deﬁnes a modeling language and the second part
adaptes the language to SIP, which is a signaling protocol
(Rosenberg et al., 2002). The ﬁrst part can be exploited as an
ofﬂine FI solution. The second part is meant to be executed
at runtime.
Compared with the language proposed by Kolberg and
Magill (2007), the CR-language appears to be less abstract
at a ﬁrst glance. Their proposed language describes the con-
nections the caller’s device might establish with other user
terminals during the call. There are two types of connec-
tions: the original connection that is supposed to be set
up, and the effective connection that is set up after the ser-
vice has been executed. Service models also contain the so
called treatments. A treatment is any processing that is run
in the network, i.e., in any server that is involved in the
ongoing call. Such a processing is triggered by an event that
may be call-related like busy tone, or not call-related like
network congestion. By introducing this concept, the authors
aimed at abstracting all kinds of events in the concept of
treatment. However, abstracting all events and kinds of
processing that a server may run in only one concept has
a serious side effect: as formulated, the treatment is vague.
This engenders a FI detection drawback. In fact, if a service
execution results in connecting the caller address to a treat-
ment instead of the targeted callee address, the detection
procedure concludes that there is a FI. The article does
not explain how the detection procedure can distinguish a
ﬁnal treatment, after which the caller will never be con-
nected to the callee, from intermediary treatments, after
which the connection between the caller and the callee can
be established. We conclude that the language proposed by
Kolberg and Magill is too abstract to the extent that the
fundamental concept of treatment is vague and might engen-
der ambiguity.
Although our work presents an ofﬂine FI solution, we
think that analyzing the online part of Kolberg and Magill
work is interesting. Kolberg and Magill applied their
approach to SIP. They then explained how the solution can
be exploited at runtime. In this part of their work, treatment
becomes clearer as they consider any SIP response and the
processing that it may trigger in a server as a treatment.
However, the authors do not explain how to distinguish
between the two types of treatments (intermediary and ﬁnal).We think that the distinction should be based on the SIP
response types: intermediary treatments are triggered by
intermediary SIP responses, i.e., 1xx, 2xx, and 3xx messages,
and ﬁnal treatments are ﬁred by ﬁnal SIP responses, i.e., 4xx,
5xx, and 6xx responses (Rosenberg et al., 2002). However,
some exceptions to this rule have to be carefully examined.
Indeed, 200 OK SIP response message, for example,
sometimes causes the session termination depending on the
preceding SIP request(s). The 407 Proxy Authentication
Required does not terminate the call; it simply requires the
caller’s device to send its authentication credentials. We
conclude that to be exploitable on line (i) the approach of
Kolberg and Magill needs to be tailored to the underlying
signaling protocol, (ii) the proposed SIP implementation of
the approach needs to be reﬁned based on the SIP response
types.
Another advantage the CR-language has over the two re-
lated works emanates from the fact that it is object-oriented.
We think that the derivation of CR-models from object ori-
ented analysis documents (UML diagrams, for example), can
be automated.6. Conclusion
We have ﬁrst developed a Cause–Restrict language to model
subscribers of telecommunication services at a high abstraction
level. A Cause–Restrict model of a subscriber provides infor-
mation such as: what is the cause of what, and what restricts
what, and speciﬁes coarsely the frequency of each operation
‘‘cause’’ or ‘‘restrict’’ by ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’. Then, we
have developed a method that detects feature interactions be-
tween telecommunication services modeled in the Cause–Re-
strict language. The latter has permitted to reduce the state
space explosion encountered in several feature interaction
detection methods. We have demonstrated the applicability
of our approach for the description of several services and
the detection of several feature interactions between them.
Known FIs and, more interestingly, new FIs have been
detected.
As a future work, we plan to study the feature interaction
resolution phase, which consists in ﬁnding solutions to the de-
tected feature interactions. Both of the online and off-line res-
olutions will be investigated.
Appendix A.
A.1. Subscriber of Originating Call Screening (OCS)
A subscriber of OCS registers users in a list LOCS so that every
outgoing call from A toward a user registered in LOCS is auto-
matically blocked (note the symmetry with TCS).
Interface model: subscriber of OCS
userOCS extends user
// Attributes
users ListOcs // Speciﬁc attribute corresponding to LOCS
// of the current subscriber of OCS
// Methods
call call(user) // Overrides the method call() of the class user
tions between telecommunication services 111The method call() of user is overridden because calls to
users registered in LOCS must not be established.
CR-behavior model: subscriber A of OCS
The following CR-relations are added to the basic
behavior:
ðB 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ A:callðBÞ restrict! A:anyComðBÞ
ðB 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ A:callðBÞ restrict! B:anyComðAÞ
ðB 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ ðA ¼ Call:InitiatorÞ restrict! B 2 Call:Participants
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If a subscriber A of Email calls a user B, an email is automat-
ically sent from A to B. Such an email may contain advertise-
ment, for example.
Interface model: subscriber of Email
userEmail extends user
// Attributes: no new attribute is deﬁned
// Methods
call call(user) // Overrides the method
call() of the class user.
void email(user, text) // New method: it sends a
text message to a user.
// The user and message
// are given as parameters.The method call() of user is overridden because Email adds
an email sending with every call. A new method email() is
added.
CR-behavior model: subscriber A of Email
The following CR-relation is added to the basic
behavior:
A:callðBÞ cause! A:emailðB; textÞA.3. Subscriber of F-email
A subscriber of F-email can forbid the reception of emails
which come with calls.
Interface model: subscriber of F-email
userFemail extends user
// Attributes
boolean forbidEmail // Generic attribute
// indicating whether reception
// of emails is forbidden,
// i.e., if service is enabled.
// We consider here
//only emails that come with
// calls, not all the emails.
// Methods
void receiveEmail(user, text) // New method: it receives an
// email with a call from a user.A new method receiveEmail() is added.
CR-behavior model: subscriber B of F-email
The following CR-relation is added to the basic behavior:A:callðBÞ
^ ðB:forbidEmail
¼ trueÞ restrict! B:receiveEmailðA; anyMessageÞA.4. Subscriber of Conference Call (CC)
A subscriber A of CC can ask his provider’s server to pro-
gram a conference call at a given future time T. The server
sends a phone number N and a password P to A who for-
wards this information to users he wants to invite to the
conference call. Any user (including A) that knows (N, P)
can join the conference at time T by calling N and then
entering P. A is considered the initiator of that conference
call.
Interface model: subscriber of CC
userCC extends user
// Methods
call program() // New method: program a
// conference call
void join(call) // New method: join a
// programmed conference call.Two new methods are deﬁned in userCC: Call=A.pro-
gram() means that A programs a conference call, A.join(Call)
means that A joins a conference call.
CR-behavior model: subscriber A of CC
The following CR-relations are added to the basic
behavior:
ðCall ¼ A:programðÞÞ ^ A:joinðCallÞ cause! A ¼ Call:Initiator
Call:acceptðXÞ cause! X ¼ Call:ParticipantsA.5. Subscriber of PIN-Calling (PIN)
This is an ofﬁce service where some privileged employees have
the right to use some services. For that, they have to dial a PIN
(Personal Identiﬁcation Number). If a PIN owner A uses the
phone of a colleague
B, A has access to all his services even if B, the phone own-
er, has not the right to use those services.
Interface model: subscriber of PIN
userPIN extends user
// Attributes
user phoneOwner // Owner of the phone used
// by the subscriber of PIN.CR-behavior model: subscriber A of PIN
The following CR-relations are added to the basic
behavior:
ðA:phoneOwner ¼ CÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞcause!C:anyComðBÞ
ðA:phoneOwner ¼ CÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause!B:anyComðCÞ
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The service Presence permits to users and servers to know the
status of other users. BLF is a speciﬁc service that needs Pres-
ence in the following way. A subscriber A of BLF can specify a
list of users for whom he wants to watch the status: idle or
busy. If A watches the status of B, every time B makes or re-
ceives a call, A’s phone displays the information that B is busy.
If B is not on the phone, A’s phone displays the information
that B is idle.
Interface model: subscriber of BLF
userBLF extends user // Attributes
user watchee // Watchee is the user watched by
// the BLF service subscriber.
boolean watcheeBusy // True means that watchee is
// busy, false means he is idle.CR-behavior model: subscriber A of BLF
The following CR-relations are added to the basic
behavior:
ðA:watchee ¼ BÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ cause!ðA:watcheeBusy ¼ trueÞ
ðA:watchee ¼ BÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ falseÞ cause!ðA:watcheeBusy ¼ falseÞ
ðA:watchee ¼ BÞ ^ ðA:watcheeBusy ¼ trueÞ cause!ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ
ðA:watchee ¼ BÞ ^ ðA:watcheeBusy ¼ falseÞ cause!ðB:busy ¼ falseÞA.7. Subscriber of Multiple Lines (ML)
A subscriber A of ML has several lines (say N) in the same
phone sharing the same number. A can accept a new call while
he is already on the phone. And so on, A can accept other calls
until all the N lines are busy.
Interface model: subscriber of ML
userML extends user
// Attributes
int busyLines // Number of busy linesCR-behavior model: subscriber B of ML
The CR-relation 5b ((B.idle=false) cause! (B.busy=true))
of the basic behavior is removed from the basic behavior,
and the following CR-relations are added:
ðB:busyLines < NÞ restrict! B:busy ¼ true;
ðB:busyLines ¼ NÞ cause! B:busy ¼ true:Appendix B.
B.1. OCS–CFU
Context: Consider A and B who are subscribers to OCS and
CFU respectively, and a third user C. Assume that A has
put C in his list LOCS, with the idea that a call initiated by A
has no effect on C (hence A is not authorized to join C). As-
sume that B has programmed an automatic unconditional for-
ward of his incoming calls towards C.
Scenario of FI: OCS prevents that A joins directly C. But if
A calls B, A will be forwarded to C (and hence A joins C)
although C is in LOCS.Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of CFU that has programmed a forward
towards C, we have by using the 2nd CR-relation of Section 2.4.2:
M1 : ðB:forward ¼ CÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause!C
2 Call:Participants
– For the subscriber A of OCS that has put C in LOCS, we obtain by
adapting the 3rd CR-relation of Appendix A.1:
M2 : ðC 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ ðA ¼ Call:InitiatorÞ restrict! C
2 Call:Participants
The pair of CR-relations (M1, M2) constitutes a cause–re-
strict pattern which is a symptom of conﬂict. We have checked
that we can reach a situation where the participation of C in a
call is at the same time implied by CFU and forbidden by OCS
(see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain resembling FIs if we replace CFU by CFBL
(Call Forward on Busy Line), CFNR (Call Forward on No
Reply), or CFT (Call Forward on Time). Another resembling
FI is TCS–CFU (studied in Section 4.2.2), which is obtained if
we replace ‘‘A is subscriber of OCS’’ by ‘‘C is subscriber of
TCS’’.
B.2. TCS–CFU
Context: Consider B and C who are subscribers to CFU and
TCS respectively, and a third user A. Assume that C has put
A in his list LTCS, with the idea that a call involving C but
not initiated by C has no effect on A (hence C is not authorized
to be joined by A). Assume that B has programmed an auto-
matic unconditional forward of his incoming calls toward C.
Scenario of FI: TCS prevents that C is directly joined by A.
But if A calls B, A will be forwarded to C (and hence C is
joined by A) although A is in LTCS.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of CFU that has programmed a forward
toward C, we obtain by adapting the 2nd CR-relation of
Section 2.4.1:
M1 : ðB:forward ¼ CÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause!C
2 Call:Participants
– For the subscriber C of TCS that has put A in LTCS, we obtain by
adapting the 4th CR-relation of Section 2.4.2:
M2 : ðA 2 C:ListTcsÞ ^ ðA ¼ Call:InitiatorÞ restrict! C
2 Call:Participants
The pair of CR-relations (M, M2) constitutes a cause–re-
strict pattern which is a symptom of conﬂict. We have checked
that we can reach a situation where the participation of C in a
call is at the same time implied by CFU and forbidden by TCS
(see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI if we replace CFU by Call For-
ward on Busy Line (CFBL), Call Forward on No Reply
(CFNR), or Call Forward on Time (CFT).
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Context: Consider two users A and B, where B is subscriber to
TCS and UM. Assume that B has put A in his list LTCS, with
the idea that a call involving B but not initiated by B has no
effect on A (hence B is not authorized to be joined by A).
Scenario of FI: TCS prevents that B is directly joined by A
in a basic call. But if A calls B who is busy or does not answer,
B receives by email a voice message from A. Hence, the call ini-
tiated by A has an effect on B, contrary to the aforementioned
idea of B when he has put A in LTCS.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of TCS has put A in LTCS, we have by using
the 2nd CR-relation of Section 2.4.2:
M1 : ðA 2 B:ListTcsÞ ^ A:callðBÞ restrict! B:anyComðAÞ
– For the subscriber B of UM who receives a call from A, we have by
using the CR-relation of Section 2.4.5:
M2 : ðB:um¼ trueÞ ^A:callðBÞ^ðB:busy¼ true_B:noAnswer¼ trueÞ cause!
B:unifiedMessagingðA; voiceMsgÞ
If in M1 we replace anyCom(A) by uniﬁedMessaging (A, ‘‘I
called you but I did not answer.’’), the pair of CR-relations
(M1, M2) constitutes a cause–restrict pattern which is a symp-
tom of conﬂict. We have checked that we can reach a situation
where a communication of B with A is at the same time im-
plied by UM and forbidden by TCS (see the above Context-
Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI TCS–Email if we replace ‘‘B is
subscriber of UM’’ by ‘‘A is subscriber of Email’’. Another
resembling FI is OCS–UM, which is obtained if we replace
‘‘B is subscriber of TCS’’ by ‘‘A is subscriber of OCS’’. Yet an-
other resembling FI is OCS–Email which is studied in the fol-
lowing subsection B4. Since UM contains the service
Voicemail (VM), we can obtain more FIs if we replace ‘‘B is
subscriber of UM’’ by ‘‘B is subscriber of VM’’. Hence the
interactions OCS-VM and TCS-VM.
B.4. OCS–Email
Context: Consider two users A and B, where A is subscriber to
OCS and Email. Assume that A has put B in his list LOCS with
the idea that a call initiated by A has no effect on B (hence A is
not authorized to join B).
Scenario of FI: OCS prevents that A joins directly B in a ba-
sic call. But if A calls B, A sends an email message to B (hence
A joins B) although B is in LOCS.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber A of OCS that has put B in LOCS, we have by
using the 1st CR-relation of Appendix A.1:
M1 : ðB 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ A:callðBÞ restrict! A:anyComðBÞ
– For the subscriber A of Email that calls B and sends him an auto-
matic email to B, we have by using the CR-relation of Appendix
A.2:
M2 : ðA:callðBÞÞ cause! A:emailðB; emailMsgÞIf in M1 we replace anyCom(B) by email(B, ‘‘hello, I am
calling you.’’), the pair of CR-relations (M1,M2) constitutes
a cause–restrict pattern which is a symptom of conﬂict. We
have checked that we can reach a situation where a communi-
cation of A with B is at the same time implied by Email and
forbidden by OCS (see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI if we replace Email by EBL
(Email on Busy Line) where the caller sends an email only if
the callee is busy, for example to inform him that he has called
him.
B.5. Email–F-email
Context: Consider A and B who are subscribers to F-email and
Email respectively. Assume that A has forbidden the reception
of emails.
Scenario of FI: the FI is due to contradictory objectives of
Email and F-email: If B calls A, should B send an email mes-
sage to A (according to Email) or should not he (according to
F-email) ?
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of Email that calls A and sends him an auto-
matic email to A, we obtain by adapting the CR-relation of Appen-
dix A.2:
M1 : ðB:callðAÞÞ cause! B:emailðA; emailMsgÞ
– For the subscriber A of F-email that forbids reception of emails, we
obtain by adapting the CR-relation of Appendix A.3:
M2 : B:callðAÞ ^ ðA:forbidEmail
¼ trueÞ restrict! A:receiveEmailðB; anyMessageÞ
– The following CR-relation is added by the designer (Step 1b) to
state that the sending by B of an email toward A is followed by
the reception by A of an email from B:
M3 : B:emailðA; emailMsgÞ cause! A:receiveEmailðB; emailMsgÞ
By applying rule r5 to M1 and M3, we obtain:
N1 : ðB:callðAÞÞ cause! A:receiveEmailðB; emailMsgÞ
The pair of CR-relations (N1, M2) constitutes a cause–re-
strict pattern which is a symptom of conﬂict. We have checked
that we can reach a situation where the transmission of an
email from B to A is at the same time implied by Email and
forbidden by F-email (see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI EEC–F-email if we replace
Email by EEC (Email on end of call) where a call participant
sends an email when he terminates a call. Another resembling
FI UM–F-email, which is obtained if we replace ‘‘A subscriber
of Email’’ by ‘‘B subscriber of UM’’.
B.6. OCS–CC
Context: Consider a subscriber A of OCS and CC. Assume that
A has put B in his listLOCS with the idea that a call initiated byA
has no effect on B (hence A is not authorized to join B).
Scenario of FI: OCS prevents that A joins directly B in a ba-
sic call. But if A programs a conference call which is joined by
A and B, A can join B although B is in LOCS.
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method:
– For the subscriber A of CC that programs a conference which is
joined by A and B, we have by using the CR-relations of Appendix
A.4:
M1 : ðCall ¼ A:programðÞÞ ^ A:joinðCallÞ cause!A ¼ Call:Initiator
M2 : Call:acceptðXÞ cause!X ¼ Call:Participants
– For the subscriber A of OCS that has put B in LOCS, we have by
using the 3rd CR-relation of Appendix A.1:
M3 : ðB 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ ðA ¼ Call:InitiatorÞ restrict! B
2 Call:Participants
By applying rule R7 To M1 and M3 with U=’’(Call=A.pro-
gram())  A.join(Call)’’, V=’’A=Call.Initiator’’, W=’’ B2
Call.Participants’’, Z=’’B2A.ListOcs’’, we obtain:
N1 : ðB 2 A:ListOcsÞ ^ ðCall
¼ A:programðÞÞ ^ A:joinðCallÞ restrict! B
2 Call:Participants
If we replace X by B in M2, the pair of CR-relations (M2,
N1) constitutes a cause–restrict pattern which is a symptom of
conﬂict. We have checked that we can reach a situation where
the participation of B in a call is at the same time implied by
CC and forbidden by OCS (see the above Context-Scenario).
We obtain a resembling FI if we replace ‘‘A subscriber of
OCS’’ by ‘‘B subscriber of TCS’’.
B.7. BLF–ML
Actually, this FI involves also the Presence service. The latter
is implicit in BLF–FM because BLF necessitates Presence (see
Appendix A.6).
Context: Consider A and B who are subscribers of BLF and
ML, respectively, and a third user C. Presence is designed so
that the status busy is set to true when the watched user is
on the phone. Hence, a subscriber of BLF will see the ‘‘wat-
chee’’ as busy when he is on the phone.
Scenario of FI: A calls B who is on the phone with C. B is
seen as busy according to BLF, while he is considered as idle
according to ML. In other words, BLF and ML do not use
the same semantic for B.busy.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber A of BLF, we have by using the 3rd CR-relation
of Appendix A.6 and the CR-relation 5b of Section 2.3:
M1 : ðA:watchee ¼ BÞ ^ ðA:watcheeBusy ¼ trueÞ cause!ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ
M2 : ðB:idle ¼ falseÞ cause! ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ
– For the subscriber B of ML, we have by using the CR-relation of
Appendix A.7:
M3 : ðB:busyLines < NÞ restrict! ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ
The pairs of CR-relations (M1, M2) and (M1, M3) consti-
tute cause–restrict patterns which are symptoms of conﬂict.
We have checked that we can reach a situation where at thesame time B is seen is busy according to BLF while he is seen
as non busy according to ML (see the above Context-Scenario).
B.8. PIN–TCS
Context: Consider A and B who are subscribers of PIN and
TCS, respectively, and a third user C. Assume that B has put
C in his list LTCS, with the idea that C is not authorized to
be joined by B. PIN is designed so that if A uses C’s phone
to enter his PIN and calls B, the latter sees A as C.
Scenario of FI: A uses C’s phone to enter his pin and calls B.
The call of A is blocked although A is not in LTCS, because the
phone used by A (C’s phone) is in LTCS.
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber A of PIN that uses C’s phone to call B, we have
by using the 1st CR-relation of Appendix A.5:
M1 : ðA:phoneOwner ¼ CÞ ^ ðCall
¼ A:callðBÞÞ cause! C:anyComðBÞ
– For the subscriber B of TCS that has put C in LTCS, we obtain by
adapting the 1st CR-relation of Section 2.4.2:
M2 : ðC 2 B:ListTcsÞ ^ ðC:callðBÞÞ restrict! ðC:anyComðBÞÞ
The pair of CR-relations (M1, M2) constitutes a cause–re-
strict pattern which is a symptom of conﬂict. We have checked
that we can reach a situation where TCS blocks a call which,
according to PIN, should not be blocked (see the above Con-
text-Scenario).
B.9. AR–UM
Context: Consider two users A and B, where B is subscriber to
AR and UM.
Scenario of FI: If A calls a busy user B, B receives an email
from A containing a voice message (according to UM) while A
is recalled back later by B (according to AR). Which of the two
actions should be executed? Should we execute both actions?
Let us now show how this FI is detected by our FI detection
method:
– For the subscriber B of AR that has programmed an automatic
recall and receives a call from A while he is busy, we have by using
the CR-relation of Section 2.4.3:
M1 : ðB:ar ¼ trueÞ ^ ðCall ¼ A:callðBÞÞ ^ ðB:busy ¼ trueÞ cause!
B:callðAÞ ^ ðB 2 Call:Participants n fCall:InitiatorgÞ ^ ðA ¼ Call:InitiatorÞ
– For the subscriber B of UM that receives a call from A and then
sends him a voicemail message, we have by using the CR-relation
of Section 2.4.5:
M2 : ðB:um¼ trueÞ^A:callðBÞ^ ðB:busy¼ true_ B:noAnswer¼ trueÞ cause!
B:unifiedMessagingðA;voiceMsgÞ
The pair of CR-relations (M1, M2) constitutes a cause–
cause pattern.
We obtain a resembling FI if we replace ‘‘B subscriber of
UM’’ by ‘‘B is subscriber of VM’’ or ‘‘A subscriber of Email’’.
We have checked that we can reach a situation where B calls A
A high abstraction level approach for detecting feature interactions between telecommunication services 115according to AR while B receives a voice message by email
according to UM (see the above Context-Scenario).
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